

Annex F: Force Structure

Overview

Army force structure provides the Nation with full spectrum land force capability. Army Transformation is designed to enhance capabilities where resident and gain capability where lacking to meet the tenants of *Joint Vision 2020*. This dynamic process drives force structure changes and supports the design of forces to meet the Army's full spectrum of missions.

The Army is comprised of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) Soldiers and civilians. In FY02, it is organized into four corps, 18 divisions (ten AC and eight Army National Guard (ARNG)), 15 ARNG enhanced separate brigades, and two ARNG strategic brigades (Figure 1). The Army

requires balanced readiness and adequate funding through FY09 for an AC with an end strength of approximately 480,000 Soldiers; a RC with an end strength of approximately 555,000 Soldiers (350,000 ARNG and 205,000 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR)); and a civilian workforce of approximately 215,000 personnel.

Army Transformation

The Army's Transformation process provides for a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. The Army will continue to modernize and recapitalize selected




Figure 1. FY02 Army Military Force Structure

Legacy Forces to retain significant overmatch capability throughout the Transformation process. Simultaneously, the Army will transform an Interim Force of at least six brigade combat teams that will meet the near-term requirements in support of warfighting CINCs by bridging the gap between our light and heavy legacy forces. During this period, the Army will significantly invest in Science and Technology to acquire the Future Combat Systems (FCS), the centerpiece of the future Objective Force capability.

Throughout Transformation, the Army's **Legacy Forces** will maintain a core force that is recapitalized and fielded with new equipment to increase lethality, situational understanding, and battlefield dominance.

The **Interim Force** is designed to meet the near-term requirements in support of warfighting CINCs. It is essentially the Army's bridge capability to the **Objective Force**. The Interim Brigade Combat Team is a fully mobile, air deployable force that normally fights as part of a division in a joint and/or coalition operation, is able to respond rapidly to crises, and operates effectively in peacekeeping or enforcement operations.

The Army began the Transformation process in early 2000 at Fort Lewis, Washington, with the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, converting to the initial **Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT)** design. It completed conversion to the new design with its last subordinate element converting in March 2001. The 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division will achieve Initial Operating Capability (IOC) by May 2003. The second unit to transform, also at Fort Lewis, is 1st

Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. The brigade converts from January 2002 through July 2002. The 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division will reach IOC in May 2004.

The Interim Force will consist of at least six IBCTs providing the joint force commander increased operational and tactical versatility to execute fast paced, distributed, non-contiguous operations. The Chief of Staff announced the 172nd Infantry Brigade, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment, the 2nd Brigade 25th Infantry Division and the 56th Brigade 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania National Guard) as the next four Interim Brigades.

The Army is developing the organizational and operational concepts for Interim organizations at division through corps level and will refine these concepts as they apply to the Objective Force. The Army's fielding of developing technologies will be fully considered in this process.

Throughout the Transformation process these principles and goals will guide the Army's force structure initiatives in the program years:

- Increase Strategic Responsiveness
- Develop the capability to put combat forces anywhere in the world in 96 hours after liftoff-in brigade combat teams. Build that capability into a momentum that generates a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days.
- Improve Operational Jointness

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- Develop Leaders for Joint and Coalition Warfighting
 - Continue AC/RC Integration
 - Man warfighting units first
 - Provide well-being of Soldiers, civilians, and families

The characteristics that will make up the Transformation force are: responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

The Army's ability to support the National Military Strategy (NMS) remains central to determining force structure requirements as we plan and execute Army transformation. The Army is leveraging information technology and structuring a totally integrated force sized and shaped to meet worldwide commitments.

Total Army Analysis and QDR 2001

QDR 2001 (QDR01), completed and published in September 2001, will have a significant impact on the Army's Total Army Analysis 2009 (TAA09). The QDR report provides a new capabilities-based strategy and a new force-planning construct that serve as the basis for TAA09. The QDR01 strategy has four elements designed to give the nation a broad set of capabilities to advance and defend our national interests in both peace and war. The elements of the new strategy are: assuring our allies and friends, dissuading adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails. The new force-planning construct replaces the QDR97 "2-MTW" construct with (1) Defend the United States, (2)

Deter aggression and coercion in forward critical areas, (3) Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts while preserving the option for the President to call for a decisive victory in one of these conflicts (to include the possibility of a regime change or occupation), and (4) Conduct a limited number of small-scale contingency operations. QDR01 also specifically notes a requirement to maintain sufficient force generation capability, as well as a strategic reserve and the need for rotational forces to support small-scale contingency operations.

QDR01 does not change the Army's active or reserve force structure or end strength. It clearly identifies Homeland Security as the highest priority. This will entail a full embracing of the mission and the identification of forces and resources to fulfill the mission. Additionally, a QDR01 directed study will address the roles and missions, forces, and resources for the Reserve Components. QDR01 also strongly supports the Army's Interim and Objective Forces. It emphasizes accelerated development of new operational concepts, organizations, and capabilities as part of Transformation. This includes improving the capability of forward-deployed forces to win rapidly and decisively with minimal reinforcement, enhance strategic responsiveness, and ease the sustainment burden of reinforcing units. However, it also highlights the requirement to "divest ourselves of legacy forces" while we transform. This will maintain, or even increase, current modernization and recapitalization challenges associated with Legacy Forces and capabilities.




Figure 2. TAA09 Army Force Structure Requirements

Given the new strategy presented in QDR01 and associated force-planning construct, Figure 2 represents a graphical depiction of this new construct.

September 11 and the ensuing war on terrorism confirmed the Army was prepared to answer the call. These events are causing the Army to reexamine field commanders' needs, especially in force and homeland protection. Results will be incorporated into Army force prioritization.

Operating Force Structure

The Army's operating force must be sufficient in both size and capabilities to meet all requirements contained in the NMS to provide the Nation with a full range of options for the international environment, as well as fulfilling CINC Theater Security Cooperation Plans. The operating force must be able to operate

across the full spectrum of conflict and remain relevant to winning our Nation's wars—by being responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable.

The operating force is the warfighting portion of the Army; the force that fights and wins the Nation's wars by providing the combat capability necessary to sustain land dominance.

The operating force accounts for approximately 76% of the Army.

The Army is fully engaged in daily activities supporting the NMS, providing the majority of forces for joint operations. The CINCs routinely employ the Army as their force of choice as a most effective tool in executing theater cooperative security arrangements. Maintaining our overseas presence and cooperative activities promotes regional stability and

gives substance to our security commitments. Additionally the Army serves as a role model for militaries of emerging democracies and promotes internal stability and democratic growth for such nations.

Generating Forces

Under Title X, the Army's Generating Force has responsibility for providing the management, development, readiness, deployment and sustainment of the Operating Force (Figure 3).

The initial effort to link the Generating Force structure to the Operating Force Structure was incorporated into the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 2007 process. This effort captured the Title X functions and capabilities, as defined in DA PAM 100-

1, across the Army's Institutional Base, Industrial Base and Infrastructure. The Army's Generating Force consists of approximately 2400 units and is comprised of the effective combination of military, DA civilian and contract personnel. These units are "linked" to the Operating Force through Command and Control, Logistical/Administrative Support, Occupational Skills and Geographic relationships.

The Generating Force, like the Operating Force, is resourced within programmed end strength. The current strength of the Generating Force is 204,000 military, 217,000 civilian and approximately 197,000 contractor. Since both forces must compete against the same resource pool, management of workforce mix (military, civilian and contractor




Figure 3. The Army's Generating Force

personnel) within the Generating Force is critical. Historically, the Generating Force has used approximately 20% of the military end strength across all three components (24% of AC; 10% of ARNG and 30% of USAR). Beginning with TAA 2007 in 1998, the Army incorporated the Defense Reform Initiatives Directive (DRID) 20 and Federal Activities Initiative Reform (FAIR) Act to improve utilization of the workforce to ensure effective Title X support within manpower constraints.

Department of the Army Civilian Personnel

Department of the Army Civilians (DAC) are major contributors to the Army's overall mission, comprising approximately 16% of the workforce and occupying vital support positions in all Army operations. More importantly, civilians provide stability and institutional knowledge regardless of the organizational level to which they are assigned, from senior management to administrative support. This is particularly true in the area of depot level maintenance, supply, combat developments, acquisition, training, medical care, research and development, test and evaluation, and facilities operations. The civilian work force is a cornerstone of the Army's CONUS-based, power projection strategy.

The overall tempo of Army operational deployments and mission requirements is ever increasing, yet the civilian work force continues to decline. These reductions are related to CONUS-based outsourcing and privatization efficiencies in base support operations and the reshaping of Army Materiel Command. The final structure of the Army civilian workforce will be affected by the manning

recommendations currently under review in support of the Transformation Strategy initiatives. The impacts (additional savings or potential growth) will be assessed in concert with the results of the recent DRID20/Federal Activities Inventory Review (FAIR) Act initiatives and programmed A-76 studies.

Division XXI and Limited Conversion Division XXI

The Army strives to stay abreast of emerging technologies and implement them to gain efficiencies in both its operating and generating force structures. In the heavy divisions of our operating forces significant change has occurred. This change is known as Division XXI.

Division XXI and the interim step, Limited Conversion Division, are FY99 force structure actions that began to lighten the Army's heavy forces (Figure 4). The objective is to optimize force structure by building on information dominance. It applies the concept of technology "enablers" that add capability to a combat system.

By FY02 these initiatives have already reduced requirements for many of the heavy system platforms in five of the six AC heavy division units, three of the ARNG heavy divisions, and all seven ARNG heavy Separate Brigades. These initiatives not only lighten the Army's heavy forces (reducing the strategic lift requirements for affected divisions by 11%), but also provide systems for "cascading" across the force to improve the overall modernization posture. The actions embedded in the *Army Vision* will further guide how we transform the Army




Figure 4. Division XXI and Limited Conversion Division XXI

to a more responsive, flexible, and capable force.

Transformation Brigades

Recognizing the necessity to rapidly provide a full spectrum capable land force to operate in joint, combined, and multinational formations, the U.S. Army will transform its force structure to meet that requirement. The initial Transformation effort focuses on providing brigade-sized forces that will be strategically deployable anywhere in the world within 96 hours to meet a variety of missions; missions ranging from humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, peacekeeping, small scale contingency war to major theater wars (Figure 5). In

addition to its strategic deployability, this force will be operationally deployable with every vehicle in the force capable of movement within a theater via C-130 aircraft.

This force will greatly enhance the Army's ability to be dominant at every point of the spectrum, combining technological overmatch with superior quality leadership, people and training to provide warfighting CINCs a land force capable of deterring, containing, stabilizing or decisively terminating a crisis.

Using a mix of available systems and Interim Armored Vehicles (IAV), as they are acquired, two Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) are formed at Fort Lewis,




Figure 5. The IBCT

Washington to serve as the initial transformation force with this capability. These units will develop the tactics, techniques and procedures required for optimization in small scale contingencies and will also inform Objective Force development.

Force structure transformation will aggressively reduce the deployed logistics footprint and replenishment demand in theater, contributing to the objective force deployability goal (a warfighting division on the ground in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days).

Aviation Transformation

In addition to ground maneuver transformation, the Army is also in the process of transforming its Aviation assets for 21st Century operations. The

theme of Aviation Transformation is divestiture of legacy systems to prepare for Objective Force systems. The Army divested all of its AH-1 Cobras in FY01 and plans to divest all UH-1s by FY04. This entails the inactivation of all four corps light utility helicopter battalions and two attack battalions. All of these units are equipped with older airframes. Additionally, the Army is redesigning two of its organic National Guard divisional Aviation brigades to combat support structure. Throughout the remainder of Army Aviation force structure, a general trend is downsizing in order to bring on board more modern capable airframes.

Medical Reengineering Initiative

The Medical Reengineering Initiative (MRI) reorganizes deployable medical

forces at Corps and Echelon Above Corps. MRI provides support not only to the Interim Force but also provides the transitional pathway for support to the Army Objective Force. The MRI organizational structure provides improved tactical mobility, reduced footprint, and increased modularity for flexible task organization that promotes scalability through easily tailored, capabilities-based, packages. This modular design easily accommodates augmentation packages to permit rapid integration of additional enabling capabilities. MRI also provides the requisite organizational platform for Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4). The synergy of MRI and MC4 will fuel Army Transformation in several ways. At objective state, this digitized organization will distribute a common operational picture of patients, medical capabilities, medical supply and medical threats in a non-linear, non-contiguous battlespace. The resultant command and control will provide scalable, seamless, multidisciplinary combat health support for joint, multinational, and interagency operations both within the homeland and around the globe.

Military Intelligence Theater Transformation

The U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is transitioning its Force Projection Brigades into multicomponent (with USAR) Theater Intelligence Brigades and/or Groups (TIB/TIG) for each theater Army Service Component Command to meet the ground intelligence requirements of each theater CINC.

The TIB/TIG plans, coordinates, manages and executes intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations, all source intelligence analysis, production, collection management and dissemination for the Army Service Component Command and Army Forces in a theater of operations. The TIB/TIG has three missions. First, it provides dedicated long-term/continuous support to the unified or sub-unified command in support of the CINCs' Theater Security Cooperation Plans. Second, the TIB/TIG provides in-theater intelligence for deploying Army Forces (ARFOR). Finally, they have the capability to provide both theater indications and warning support, and intelligence support to counter-terrorism operations.

TIB/TIG force conversion provides dedicated theater-level intelligence assets and enables the Army to be strategically responsive and dominant across the full spectrum of operations by providing advanced indications and warning, a tailored ability to shape the operational environment through continuous engagement and a theater-level intelligence force postured for both contemporary and future operational environments.

Institutional Redesign (Generating Forces)

The Institutional or Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) organizations are the key component of the Generating Force. Redesign of the Institutional Force is an integral part of the overall Army Transformation strategy.

Institutional Army Reengineering. The following actions, as a minimum, are key to successfully achieving the Army's Transformation objective:

- Divest nonessential functions, remove unnecessary layering and duplication, consolidate functions, resource in the most cost-effective manner, and privatize/outsource functions where applicable.
- Transform Army Headquarters (Corps through MACOM).
- Reallocate resources supporting core competencies; fully integrate those resources across the Army, other Services, and DoD.
- Reduce acquisition cycles by at least half, anticipating the needs of future organizations; complete major acquisitions within three budget cycles.
- Transform Army test and evaluation by getting involved earlier, using more modeling and simulation, putting Soldiers on the equipment sooner, and conducting appropriate developmental testing to field systems sooner while ensuring they meet mission requirements.
- Create and sustain a customer-focused learning organization that evaluates itself, eliminates obsolete structures, and designs better processes.
- Rapidly create and project an appropriate and capable force to any area of the world.

- Accomplish the reengineered generating force within the Army Vision.

At every level and in all organizations, Soldiers and civilians must aggressively implement current initiatives, as well as generate new reforms to produce efficiencies and, ultimately, savings for the Army. Through reinvestment and recapitalization, these savings will contribute greatly to the goals of providing modernized equipment to the force, reorganizing and preparing trained and ready units, and providing essential quality of life programs. Additionally, the nature of our future power projection Army will demand focused/precise logistics and improved command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR). As called for in *JV 2020*, we will apply quality management principles and the best business practices available to develop and implement focused logistics.

Reserve Components (RC)

The Reserve Components provide approximately 54% of the total Army strength. The Army force structure goal is to have all active and reserve component elements interchangeable. Nevertheless there are several force structure programs that highlight the Army's Reserve Components.

Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS)

As part of the Army's warfighting capability, the ARNG will continue to program 15 enhanced separate brigades and two Special Forces Groups as well

Army National Guard Division Redesign

The Problem ...

- CS/CSS shortage
 - ... a long-standing Army problem.
 - ... highlighted by the CORM & the 1997 QDR.
- TAGs introduced an idea to solve the problem.
- CSA/SecArmy approved the plan March 1996.

The Plan ...




Figure 6. ADRS Implementation

as its divisional elements. In addition, the ARNG continues execution of the ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS). This concept converts up to 12 ARNG maneuver brigades and slice elements from two divisions to CS / CSS forces required to support the Army's warfighting requirements (Figure 6).

The ARNG Division Redesign Study (ADRS) converts approximately 48,000 of ARNG combat force structure to CS/CSS by FY09. In phases one and two of the implementation plan for ADRS, the ARNG is converting six brigades to resource approximately 20,000 of CS/CSS between FY00-07. The ARNG will convert an additional 28,000 spaces (six brigades and slice elements from two

divisions) to complete phases three and four of ADRS. The division and brigade headquarters will be used to form composite command and control headquarters for the CS/CSS structure. Phases three and four decisions are pending results of the CS/CSS transformation initiatives work and development of Objective Force requirements.

Approximately \$2 billion is budgeted for FY00-07 to resource the ADRS plan. Additional resources will be applied in future Army Plans to procure necessary resources by FY09 and complete the ADRS conversions by FY11.

Multicomponent Units

The multicomponent initiative combines personnel from more than one component on a single authorization document. The intent of this initiative is to maximize the integration of AC and RC resources. The initiative does not change a unit's doctrinal requirement for personnel and equipment. No limit has been established for the number of units that may become multicomponent and the concept is available to both active and reserve component units. The ultimate decision for nominating a unit as multicomponent is based on mission requirements, unique component capabilities and limitations, readiness implications, efficiencies to be gained, and the ability and willingness of each component to contribute the necessary resources.

The objective for the Army is to establish multicomponent as a routine part of the Army culture. Candidates will be identified during the biennial TAA process, Command Plan process, or as part of a major Army command initiative.

Currently there are 89 nominated and 45 existing multicomponent units in the Army.

Conclusion

The Army must provide the Nation an array of deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable formations, which are affordable and capable of reversing the conditions of human suffering rapidly and resolving conflicts decisively. To do this, we must design organizational force structures that are interchangeable for different and changing full spectrum environments. We must also equip and train those organizations for effectiveness in any of the missions the Army is charged to perform.

The U.S. Army's force structure must rapidly evolve to best support the NMS and continue meeting the Army's Title 10 responsibilities, while posturing for the challenges of the next generation. The Army's Transformation Strategy provides the means to achieve future success while mitigating current risks.